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ABSTRACT: Iranian philosopher Reza Negarestani’s first 2008 book Cyclonopedia was written 
under the influence of Nick Land’s nihilistic and antihumanist philosophy which seeks to 
critique anthropomorphism by confronting us with our coming extinction beyond which our 
concepts of reason cannot reach. Since Cyclonopedia’s publication, however, Negarestani has left 
behind Landian nihilism to develop in his 2018 book Intelligence and Spirit a neorationalist 
philosophy of mind whose primary influences are Sellars, Brandom, and Hegel. At 579 clearly 
written yet dense pages, it is difficult even for a review article to encapsulate the book in its 
entirety. The first half of this article instead aims to provide a sense of the book’s overall project 
by focusing on how Negarestani outlines and develops his neorationalist philosophy through a 
critique of Land’s antihumanism. 
Never one to remain silent whilst others seek to resurrect Hegel from the dead, since December 
2018, Land has been releasing a draft on his blog Urban Futures 2.1 of his new monograph Crypto-
Current: Bitcoin and Philosophy, which proffers the most up to date articulation of his main 
antihumanist tenets. Having organized Intelligence and Spirit around Negarestani’s objections to 
Land, this article’s second half turns to Crypto-Current to see how Land is able to provide 
convincing responses to each of Negarestani’s objections, showing some to be based on 
strawman characterizations, others to stem from misunderstandings of Land’s position, and still 
others to lack traction at all. By putting Negarestani and Land’s new books in combat, we will 
ultimately see that the grounds for Negarestani’s efforts to move continental philosophy from its 
Kanto-Landian phase to a renewed Hegelian phase is unsuccessful in that antihumanism is 
able to respond to each of his objections in kind. 
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Until recently, Iranian philosopher Reza Negarestani was best known for his 
2008 theory-fiction Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials.1 That book 
was written under the influence of Nick Land’s virulently nihilistic and 
antihumanist philosophy which seeks to critique dogmatic metaphysics—
understood more broadly as anthropomorphism—by confronting us with the 
brute reality of our coming extinction beyond which our concepts of reason 
cannot reach. In particular, Land envisioned technocapitalism as the primary 
mechanism for deterritorializing reason as its incessant revolutionization of the 
productive forces would ultimately culminate in an artificial posthuman 
superintelligence which completely exceeds the bounds of our comprehension: 
It is utterly superstitious to imagine that the human dominion of terrestrial 
culture is still marked out in centuries, let alone in some metaphysical perpetuity. 
The high road to thinking no longer passes through a deepening of human 
cognition, but rather through a becoming inhuman of cognition, a migration of 
cognition out into the emerging planetary technosentience reservoir, into 
‘dehumanized landscapes’.2 
For Land as for the young Negarestani, technocapitalism’s creation of strong 
AI will mark nothing less than the ultimate critique of our transcendental 
illusions to be able to access the real insofar as it erects a wall across the future 
over which we cannot see, let alone survive. 
Since the publication of Cyclonopedia, however, Negarestani has left behind 
Landian nihilism to develop a neorationalist philosophy of mind whose primary 
influences are Sellars, Brandom, and Hegel. The result of the last decade of 
Negarestani’s intellectual development is the 2018 Intelligence and Spirit. At 579 
clearly written yet dense pages, it is difficult even for a review article to 
encapsulate the book in its entirety. My approach is to instead give a sense of its 
overall project by focusing on how Negarestani outlines and develops his 
neorationalist philosophy through a critique of Land’s antihumanism. This 
tactic might at first seem incongruous given that Intelligence and Spirit never 
actually mentions Land by name. Since Negarestani repeatedly critiques 
antihumanists, nihilists, irrationalists and proponents of both capitalism and 
 
1 Negarestani, Reza, Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials, Melbourne, Re.press, 2008. 
2 Land, Nick, ‘Circuitries’, in Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987-2007, eds. Robin Mackay and Ray 
Brassier, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2012, p. 293. 
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posthuman superintelligence, all of which are identifiably Landian positions to 
which Negarestani once held, it is nonetheless clear that Land is the book’s 
chief target, its He Who Must Not Be Named. Even Negarestani’s Hegelian 
critiques of Kant can actually be read as implicit objections to and refutations 
of Land insofar as his key contention is that antihumanism paradoxically 
recapitulates the same dogmas as Kant’s conservative humanism. So what this 
article’s first half shows is that Negarestani aims to move continental 
philosophy from its Kanto-Landian phase to a renewed Hegelian phase 
inflected through Sellars and Brandom’s pragmatist interpretations of Hegel.  
Addressing Negarestani’s objections to Land still leaves open the question 
as to whether they are actually valid and convincing arguments. Never one to 
remain silent whilst others seek to resurrect Hegel from the dead, since 
December 2018, Land has been releasing a draft on his blog Urban Futures 2.1 of 
his new monograph Crypto-Current: Bitcoin and Philosophy. Although it focuses on 
the phenomenon of bitcoin as the title suggests, the book also proffers Land’s 
most up to date articulation of his main antihumanist tenets with which 
Negarestani takes issue. Having organized Intelligence and Spirit around 
Negarestani’s objections to Land, this article’s second half turns to Crypto-
Current to see how Land is able to provide convincing responses to each of 
Negarestani’s objections, showing some to be based on strawman 
characterizations, others to stem from misunderstandings of Land’s position, 
and still others to lack traction at all. By putting Negarestani and Land’s new 
books in combat, we will ultimately see that the grounds for Negarestani’s 
efforts to move continental philosophy beyond its Kanto-Landian phase is 
unsuccessful in that antihumanism is able to respond to each of his objections 
in kind. 
1. ANTIHUMANISM IS A HUMANISM 
Drawing on Hegel’s idea of geist as a community of rational agents and Sellars 
and Brandom’s emphasis on the importance of language to sociality, 
Negarestani proposes in the first chapter ‘Between Conception and 
Transformation’ to take a ‘functional’ approach to the philosophy of mind by 
conceiving of the two necessary conditions for the possibility of the mind’s 
structuration of all intelligible experience as the sociality of agents in a semantic 
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space of public language: ‘only in virtue of the multi-layered semantic structure 
of language does sociality become a normative space of recognitive-cognitive 
rational agents’.3 Negarestani is particularly concerned with how sociality and 
semantics enables the mind to not only model itself and become self-conscious, 
but also to transform itself according to historically mutable norms beyond any 
fixed nature or substantive essence: ‘in conceiving itself as the configurative or 
structuring consciousness of itself in the world (or universe), mind is endowed 
with a history rather than a mere nature or past. […] Once there is a history of 
history, there is the possibility of abolishing what is given in history’.4 
Negarestani’s main target here are any and all theories which treat mind as 
something ineffable or given by nature, since they fail to grasp that any 
immediate perception of mind is always-already mediated by historically 
revisable concepts and norms provided by mind itself. Drawing on Hegel’s 
critique of Kant’s ‘conservative’ notion of the categories of mind as fixed and 
given when they are really contingent and revisable, Negarestani takes 
particular issue with the ‘antihumanist’ idea of human nature. Since 
antihumanists conceive of the human as a fixed set of properties which limit 
how much of the world can become intelligible to us, they can only critique the 
human through our absolute negation rather than through a determinate 
negation which would come to see humanity’s transcendental structures of 
experience at any one time as contingent, and hence expandable. The irony is 
that the very attempt to negate the human altogether ends up perpetuating the 
dogmas of conservative humanism by mistaking local and contingent aspects of 
mind as necessary and universal. In the same vein, Negarestani rejects the idea 
of capitalism as the completed totality of history in favor of conceiving it as able 
to be negated by the community of rational agents positing new norms for how 
society ought to be governed: 
The suspension of the self-portrait of the human or of the capitalist mode of 
production as the alleged immediate totality of the state of affairs is thereby 
differentiated from naïve forms of posthumanism, antihumanism, and simple 
abolitionist revolutionary politics—a revolutionary politics in which negation is 
decoupled from the process of determination and instead is turned into a 
fetishized form of abstract negation which, in its indeterminacy, presupposes a 
 
3 Negarestani, Reza, Intelligence and Spirit, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2018, p. 1. 
4 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 2. 
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metaphysical account of totality whose immediacy is actual.5 
Just as the antihumanists’ efforts to eliminate the human altogether maintains 
conservative humanism’s reification of the human’s contingent and local 
aspects as if they were universal and necessary, so do they tend to support 
reactionary political systems which purportedly abolish the human even as they 
sustain and even exacerbate humanity’s most dogmatic and pre-critical aspects 
(such as white supremacy or Christian patriarchy). 
Whereas antihumanists seeks to negate the human altogether in the name 
of an abstract, unintelligible beyond, Negarestani proposes that the human 
must certainly be transformed by stripping away its contingent transcendental 
structures constraining its field of intelligible experience, but that this should be 
done through the determinate negation of giving and asking for reasons, 
justifications and norms in the semantic space of public language. Instead of 
diagnosing humans’ conservative traits so as to suspend them, antihumanists 
inadvertently side with conservative humanism’s dogmatic image of the human 
purportedly in the name of a radical alterity: ‘inasmuch as such anti-humanist 
alternatives have already foregone the geistig resources necessary to diagnose 
and suspend the conservative traits or characteristics of the human, they 
become the servants of that very conservative concept of the human they 
originally set out to escape’.6 Pace the antihumanists’ reading of humans and 
capitalism, for Negarestani, intelligence is always something that can be 
concretely negated by modelling itself so as to determine what aspects of mind 
are necessary (sociality and semantics) and what are contingent, and hence 
subject to revision through the postulation of new norms for thought and 
action: ‘by recognizing what is universal and necessary about itself, mind 
becomes capable of revising the transcendental types or structures it previously 
deemed to be universal and necessary for the realization of its abilities or 
cognitions’.7  
Negarestani’s critique of antihumanism as a crypto-humanism hinges on 
the distinction between norms and nature, reasons and causes, thinking and 
being. Following Sellars’ distinction between the manifest and the scientific 
 
5 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 8. 
6 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 61. 
7 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 23. 
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image, Negarestani argues that the mind is dependent on material substrata 
without being reducible to them to the extent it is able to develop and pursue 
norms which are not given in nature, and which are therefore revisable by the 
community of rational agents. Here, Negarestani opposes the ‘flat picture’ that 
reduces the mind’s properties to its material substrata in a one-to-one 
correspondence without qualitative distinction. The trouble with the flat 
picture is that it leads to a ‘panpsychism’ which sees the properties and norms 
of mind as always-already in nature in a way which makes it impossible to 
specify the precise, necessary conditions for the possibility of mind in sociality 
and semantics, as if galaxies and other natural objects also satisfied these 
conditions: ‘anything can be furnished with mind, be it a rock or a piece of 
“swiss cheese”. […] Thinking becomes ubiquitous to the extent that there are 
no specific organizing or explanatory constraints for its realization’.8 In 
particular, Negarestani takes issue with the notion of an artificial posthuman 
superintelligence for depending on a Bayesian predictive model of mind as 
simply an information processing system without taking into account the 
necessary conditions for the realization of not just sentient, but specifically 
sapient and reflexive minds, which can only arise through a collective, 
deprivatized language: 
The myth of a superintelligence or an unbounded posthuman intelligence is 
precisely the product of biases ingrained in the flat or unconstrained picture of 
function. In other words, such views inexorably forgo the tasks of explaining what 
it means to call something intelligence, and describing the exact structural 
constraints by virtue of which something can be identified as exhibiting 
intelligent behaviors.9 
Another flattening that elicits Negarestani’s ire is the global genealogical view 
that, given social power relations can influence and corrupt reason, then all 
reason must be tainted by power relations without exception. Without a 
minimal distinction between reason and power relations, however, the 
genealogical critique is itself reducible to power relations inasmuch as it, too, 
relies on rational resources to wage its all-out war against reason:  
Such a thesis is based on flattening the distinctions between social linguistic 
 
8 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, pp. 14-5. 
9 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 15. 
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practices and social practices in general. […] Absent this differentiation, any talk 
of real or material conditions, and therefore any critique of social relations, is 
tilted more than everyday talk which, lacking objectivity, is in every way arbitrary 
and dogmatically subjective.10 
Consequently, genealogical critique is unable to diagnose the specific and 
contingent conditions warping reason which could then be suspended, instead 
reifying those conditions as the substantive essence of reason tout court.  
In the third chapter, Negarestani calls the global genealogist the ‘greedy 
sceptic’ who claims that we cannot know anything all the while implying that 
we can know this to be true: ‘the greedy sceptic assertively claims that we do 
not know anything and we will never know anything, while at the same time 
confidently laying out a lavish theory of what he takes to be the case’.11 The 
paradox is that the greedy sceptic rejects reason’s socio-semantic conditions of 
realization by reducing it to natural information processing or power relations, 
and yet can only describe reason as such by drawing on reason’s socio-semantic 
capabilities. For Negarestani, any claim to access being without the mediation 
of conceptual language is subject to Sellars’ myth of the given by mistaking a 
conceptual access to truth as a direct and immediate perception:  
The omission of any consideration of language when addressing issues such as 
truth, thinking, life, and Being inevitably leads to an iteration of the myth of the 
given and culminates in an atavistic metaphysics which is both dogmatic and 
precritical. This is because any talk of truth, life, or Being presupposes semantic 
structuration within the universe of discourse.12 
Given that the greedy sceptic can only critique the limits of reason by drawing 
upon reason, they are not so much critiquing the intelligible power of reason in 
general as they are reason’s local and contingent constraints. 
2. HOW TO MAKE OURSELVES AN AGI 
In the second chapter ‘An Outside View of Ourselves as Experimental AGI 
(Problems, Concepts and Models)’, Negarestani proposes the following thought 
experiment: we can determine the necessary conditions for the possibility of 
 
10 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 17. 
11 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 152. 
12 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 296. 
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apperceptive intelligence if we imagine that we are trying to construct an 
artificial general intelligence (AGI). Before working through this thought 
experiment, Negarestani first identifies and refutes various posthuman 
conceptions of AGI, such as David Roden’s disconnection thesis for 
unbounded posthumanism, as well as the dominant conception of artificial 
superintelligence as radically other than what we are, and usually with 
malevolence as a default outcome. The problem is that such a view presupposes 
certain characteristics of mind which are far from given and self-evident, such 
as personal autonomy, value appraisal and revision, organized goal seeking, 
and self-enhancement. Each of these characteristics presupposes forms of self-
knowledge to enable superintelligence to model itself, its goals and its values, 
and hence self-augment to better realize those values and goals. So, the 
capacities the superintelligence model focuses on are not the default outcome, 
since they tacitly imply more general necessary conditions like sociality and 
semantics: 
Those narratives of superintelligence that make up the majority of views and 
hypotheses about AGI are deeply enmeshed in notions whose supposedly 
inherent association with strong forms of AI is far from self-evident: personal 
autonomy, value appraisal, and revision, organize goal-seeking and self-
enhancement. Each of these presupposes forms of self-knowledge that enable and 
incite purposeful action and deliberate interaction: negotiation, persuasion, or 
even threat and plotting.13 
Instead of an ‘apophatic theology’ of posthuman AGI as radically other or as 
grounded upon certain secondary and contingent aspects of mind, Negarestani 
again advocates that we look for the mind’s necessary conditions in the socio-
semantic space of reasons. 
It is worthwhile outlining the book’s appendix at this point since it also takes 
issue with AI researchers like Nick Bostrom and Eliezer Yudkowsky’s 
understanding of superintelligence as an ideal Bayesian model of inductive 
prediction. Negarestani draws on Hume’s problem (as also updated by 
Goodman and Putnam) to contest models of mind which see induction as alone 
sufficient for general apperceptive intelligence by drawing probable conclusions 
based on regularly observed premises. As Hume long ago realized, we cannot 
be certain that our experience of regularities in the past will hold for the future, 
 
13 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, pp. 107-8. 
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and hence of the power of induction as the sole means for intelligent 
predictions and choices: ‘the generalization of Hume’s problem of induction 
would count as a clear refutation of such a purely inductive model of general 
intelligence’.14 Drawing on Bertrand Russell’s five minutes ago paradox 
according to which the whole universe could have been created moments ago 
with our memory of the past included, Negarestani further contends that we 
cannot even be certain of the validity of our past experiences upon which 
induction depends to makes its generalizations from observed patterns: ‘a 
puritan inductivist who believes that general intelligence or the construction of 
theories can be sufficiently modelled on inductive inferences alone takes for 
granted the reliability of the information about the past’.15 While the argument 
for simplicity might provide one last-ditch defense of the overdetermined 
inductive model of mind, Negarestani persists that simplicity is merely a 
pragmatic rather than objective rule. After all, there can certainly be cases 
where ‘the false theory may be simpler than the true one’.16 In Negarestani’s 
view, we ought to refrain from modelling the mind on an inductive or any one 
method of cognition in favor of conceiving mind as a complex interaction of 
many epistemic approaches: ‘this problem, however, could have been avoided 
had the model of general intelligence accommodated epistemic 
multimodality’.17 If we take ourselves as a case study, we seldom use the 
inductive approach alone, but rather in a hierarchical conjunction with other 
modes of epistemic enquiry whose order of priority we are yet to fully 
comprehend. Of course, the only way we can even begin to catalogue these 
modes of enquiry and their rules of interaction is if we abandon the reduction 
of all rationality to the inductive model alone. 
Returning to the second chapter’s key question as to whether AGI should 
diverge or converge with humans, Negarestani answers both yes and no. If we 
limit the concept of the human to its local and contingent conditions of 
experience as per both dogmatic humanism and antihumanism alike, then AGI 
ought to diverge. However, this ‘hard parochialist’ view leads to both the 
 
14 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 523. 
15 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, pp. 526-7. 
16 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 544. 
17 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 535. 
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pessimist’s doubt that mind could ever be artificially created except through 
uniquely human transcendental structures, and the optimist’s overconfidence 
that it can easily be created through more common and yet local traits like 
predictive Bayesian informational processing: 
Hard parochialists tend to overemphasize the prevalence of intelligent behaviors 
and their sufficiency for general intelligence, and become heavily invested in 
various panpsychist, pancomputationalist, and uncritically anti-anthropocentric 
idealists that serve to justify their theoretical commitments and methodologies.18 
Pace hard parochialism, Negarestani insists that, although all cognitions are 
pattern-governed activities, our specifically conceptual activities are a unique 
pattern-governed activity. If we therefore redefine the human as the necessary, 
minimal conditions of sociality and semantics for the realization of mind, then 
AGI should converge with us: ‘AGI should be modelled on the human in the 
sense that it should functionally converge on the conditions and capacities 
necessary for the realization of human cognitive-practical abilities.’19 For 
Negarestani, the project of building AGI is not the genesis of something 
radically other than humans, but our own pilgrimage of self-discovery as we 
come to model ourselves to determine the necessary conditions of mind, 
separating them from our contingent structures of experience: ‘the treatment of 
ourselves as a toy model AGI should be seen as an attempt—incomplete at best 
and fundamentally crude at worst—to distinguish what is necessary for the 
realization of general intelligence (in organic species or inorganic systems) from 
what is contingent’.20 In failing to distinguish between the necessary and 
contingent conditions of mind, antihumanists could never make an AGI that 
would supposedly surpass humankind since their apophatic model has no room 
for mind’s necessary conditions of sociality and semantics any more than it does 
for our own contingent transcendental structures. To the extent that they do 
not bother to diagnose and separate the contingent constraints upon mind from 
the necessary conditions, antihumanists can even wind up projecting certain 
unrecognized humanistic traits onto AGI. 
 
18 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 111. 
19 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 118. 
20 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 139. 
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3. SOCIALTY AND SEMANTICS  
Negarestani’s thought experiment into the conditions for the realization of AGI 
takes place over four chapters all entitled ‘This I, or We or It, the Thing, 
Which Speaks’. The third chapter subtitled ‘Forms of Intuition’ begins by 
imagining an automaton programmed to fulfill certain goals and preferences 
like self-preservation, and built with an input-output framework for sensing its 
environment without having any conceptual awareness of itself or the world. 
Negarestani proposes a scenario borrowed from the opening of 2001: A Space 
Odyssey where the automaton senses some fuzzy grey stuff (a monkey) emerge 
behind another fuzzy item (a bush) and approach a black pattern (the monolith) 
before making a noise. Although the automaton has no conceptual awareness 
of the monkey, the noise or the monolith, the fact that it senses anything at all 
presupposes that its experience is structured through the pure forms of space 
and time. The automaton thus has a sense of movement in space without a 
concept of the relations between things, let alone a self-concept: ‘the automaton 
has a sense of movement, and with that, a rudimentary sense of space and of 
the presence and perspectival spatial relations between items in space’.21 It  also 
has a temporal perspective in the sense that it possesses an awareness and 
memory of successive sensory impressions produced by objects in its 
environment in such a way as to be able to nonconceptually anticipate and 
respond to them based on its preferences: ‘self-locating in time means a 
rudimentary capacity to be aware of successive sensory affections produced by 
objects in its environment and to actively—but nonconceptually—respond to 
such affection’.22 
The fourth chapter ‘Some Unsettling Kantian News, as Delivered by 
Boltzmann (An Excursus on Time)’ marks a more detailed discussion of time. 
Although we are accustomed to looking at time as if it were flowing from the 
present into the future, Negarestani sides with Boltzmann’s essentially Kantian 
argument that we cannot draw conclusions about time’s objective reality from 
our linear, phenomenal experience of it. While Boltzmann initially explained 
physical phenomena in terms of an entropic conception of time in a way which 
correlates to our temporal experience, he eventually came to question what 
 
21 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 178. 
22 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 183. 
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time looks like if we reverse its directionality. Assuming this nonlinear view of 
time then raised the question not as to why entropy increases from the present 
to the future, but rather why entropy is so low to begin with when we would 
expect it to increase from the future to the past, too. What Boltzmann 
discovered was that changing perspectives from an intuitive, temporal 
perspective to an atemporal one transformed something that initially seemed 
natural (low entropy in the past) into something unnatural and unaccounted 
for. Boltzmann’s insight is an example of how we tend to project our subjective 
intuitions onto the world in a way which uncritically mistakes an empirical 
object for its conditions of objectivity: ‘we are frequently liable to project our 
subjective assumptions to the world and, in doing so, to posit that which itself 
requires explanation (qua subjective characteristics) as an objective explanatory 
feature’.23 Ultimately, Negarestani uses the example of Boltzmann to propose 
that we need further critical examination into the distorting effects of our 
temporal intuitions on our scientific methods and models. 
At the chapter’s end, Negarestani argues that we ought to conceive of the 
mind’s dialectical movement of self-conception and self-transformation as not 
so much happening in time as incarnating time itself. Since this dialectical 
movement by which we strip away the contingent from the necessary aspects of 
mind is the condition of all intelligible experience, it is the temporal structure of 
mind as such: ‘history as the self-actualization of the Concept is the Idea’s own 
time—a time that is neither opposed to another time, nor is an abstraction of 
time, nor a time outside of time, but is the eternal or time as such’.24 Here, 
Negarestani opposes the antihumanists’ alternate view of time as a dwarfing of 
the human for being a subjective account which fails to do away with the 
dogmas of conservative humans, instead reinforcing them by reifying the local 
and contingent field of human experience as an immediate given which time 
purportedly overcomes: ‘images of time as an endless flow that underlines the 
insignificance of the human and its paltry concerns turn out to be antihumanist 
veneer upon a subjectivist account of time which, far from breaking from the  
dogmas of humanism, reinforces a deeply conservative form of humanism’.25  
 
23 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, pp. 219-20. 
24 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, pp. 236-7. 
25 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 237. 
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The fifth chapter ‘Objectivity and Thought’ returns to the thought 
experiment’s main thread by imagining that the spatio-temporally grounded 
automaton (now named Kanzi or K) is equipped with electromechanical 
devices for the production of sounds, which permit it to communicate with 
other, already fully sapient automata (named Sue and Matata, or S and M). 
Drawing on Jay F. Rosenberg’s Kant-Sellars model of the transition from inner 
sense to thought episodes, Negarestani now asks how K can go from having 
sense impressions to becoming aware of counterfactuals and the distinction 
between appearance and reality by inferring multiple possible causes for 
different phenomena. To achieve this, K needs to enter a community of 
rational agents where its impressions can be contested, debated and revised 
with counterfactuals provided by S and M: ‘in order for K to distinguish the 
orders of before and after and to incorporate them into a growing space of 
implications regarding one and the same world, […] K must model its private 
meta-awarenesses on a public and deprivatized language’.26 For K to 
understand what S and M are saying as meaningful and not just noise, K needs 
to understand the functional role the noises they emit play in world-presenting 
(e.g., that sound x means y). When S and M tell K that sound x means fuzzy 
grey item has moved behind the black pattern, K is able to assign the sound to 
that state of the world, developing awarenesses of its awarenesses, or simply 
meta-awarenesses: ‘K is able to recognize these reports and, additionally, to 
map them to its own de facto meta-awarenesses. Consequently, K now acquires 
labelled meta-awarenesses’.27 In this way, K’s sense of the world is perturbed 
by the possibility of other perspectives provided by S and M, perspectives 
which both contradict and contest some of K’s immediate impressions, as well 
as facilitate an awareness of things outside its dispositional interests, thereby 
giving it a unique sense of self in opposition to the world of other agents. It is 
this awareness of the distinction between seeming and being which is ultimately 
necessary for K to make veridical normative judgments of objective truth and 
falsity. Through its interactions with S and M, K is able to grow its repertoire 
of labelled awarenesses and perpetually update them so that it can eventually 
 
26 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 260. 
27 Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 262. 
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take on a critical stance beyond its initial, naïve perspective on things: ‘it is with 
the development of this increasingly aperspectival world-picture assembled out 
of external partial world-pictures whereby the child comes to inhabit an 
“objective self-critical stance”’.28  
The sixth chapter ‘Dasein of Geist’ focuses on the conditions for the 
possibility of language. Follow Sellars’ theory of ‘picturing’, Negarestani 
explains that, while K can register or picture sounds which the monkey and 
other automata make, it does not yet know what those sounds mean. Pictures 
only map labels onto sensations in a one-to-one correspondence without 
establishing any new relations between those labels and sensations. What is 
therefore needed are ‘symbols’ that can move from syntactical pictures to 
combinatorial relations between pictures: ‘pictures qua signs can only capture 
the one-to-one mappings between pattern-governed regularities in the real 
order (Ei-EjEi-Ej*). It is in virtue of this interrelational order of symbols (i.e., 
symbolic syntax rather than syntax in terms of causal regularities) that the 
relations between different patterns or world-picturings can be encoded’.29 
Negarestani gives the example of how an animal can vocalize an alarm call at 
the sight of a predator and statistically associate the noise with the presence of 
predators. The noise does not, however, tell the animal the type of predator or 
its exact location. To move from indexical signs to more complex relations 
between pattern-governed regularities, the animal requires abstract, 
nonrepresentational symbols which links pictures to one another. In the case of 
K, this can happen if the continuous sound it emits is discretized into distinct 
sound tokens, allowing a wider array of sounds and hence symbols to emerge 
which are not directly associated with pictures. By interacting with S and M, K 
is able to associate discrete sounds with certain meanings and uses, such as a 
specific sound to indicate the type of predator and another to highlight its 
specific location: 
A model of self-organization can be conceived in the multi-agent system whereby 
the mere vocalizations of the automata (i.e., the reuse of sound cues or acoustic 
signals) can converge on a small finite repertoire of preferable coarsely discretized 
sounds which do not communicate or represent anything, in that they are no 
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longer sign-vehicles but abstract acoustic elements that can be combined into 
composite sound-tokens.30 
Over time, K can not only represent a fuzzy grey item, but say that the fuzzy 
grey item ‘was there’ and ‘is now next to the monolith’, and so on. 
The seventh chapter ‘Language as Interaction as Computation’ further 
examines this transition from pictures to symbols, from syntax to semantics. 
Based on Brandom’s inferentialist pragmatism, Negarestani argues that 
conceptual meaning is ultimately grounded in the justified use of expressions 
according to certain norms and rules, which are asserted, debated and revised 
by the community of rational agents. K’s noises or behavior can thus only 
count as saying or claiming something if they know what to say or do in 
accordance with rules, standards and norms, such that they can draw other 
inferences implied by each saying or doing: ‘the noises or behaviors of 
interlocutors can only count as saying or claiming something if said 
interlocutors know what to do—in accordance with rules and following some 
standards or norms—such that they can draw inferences from each other’s 
claims’.31 For instance, endorsing the belief that x is red entitles one to believe 
that x is also colored, but not that x is also green. Here, the meaning of the 
concept red is grasped by understanding the rules for what inferences follow 
from it. These inferences are decided in dialogue with others such that they can 
be contested and updated. So, if S asserts that x is actually red mixed with blue, 
and K acknowledges the force of S’s assertion, then we get the new rule that x is 
purple for which different inferences follow than if x were red. In this way, the 
meaning of concepts is grounded on conditional justifications for what 
inferences follow, inferences which can be challenged and revised through the 
game of giving and asking for reasons. 
Returning to the book’s main theory of mind, Negarestani argues that it is 
in knowing how one thinks by giving and asking for reasons in interactions with 
others that we are able to expand our intelligible field of experience and 
knowledge of ourselves and the world as we contest established norms and 
claims, and seek justifications for new ones in a dialectical process of rational 
enlightenment. There is thus no need to fear a malevolent AGI, since if it really 
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possesses the socio-semantic conditions of mind, it will have the ability to 
update and revise its goals and norms in dialogue with other rational agents, be 
they humans or other AGI: ‘if these machines exhibit complex practical 
inferential abilities, concept-using capacities, and autonomy, their ideals—
whatever they might be—will necessarily be susceptible to the self-correcting 
propensities of reason brought about by the autonomous order of 
conception’.32 Whereas things in nature like forests and trees do not want 
anything, any general apperceptive intelligence, be it human or machinic, must 
harbor the ability to model itself so as to transform its self-conception, goals and 
values, since being able to do so in the space of reasons is the very formal 
condition for the possibility of mind in the first place.  
4. BECOMING-DIVINE: TOWARDS A PLATONIC NIHILISM 
In the last chapter ‘Philosophy of Intelligence’, Negarestani makes a case for 
philosophy as the organon of intelligence’s becoming conscious of its true 
conditions of possibility by separating them from its contingent transcendental 
structures. As we have seen, the first prerequisite for becoming-intelligent is to 
separate thought from being and reasons from causes by recognizing that, even 
as thinking relies on physical processes, it is relatively autonomous from them 
in terms of its self-determining, rule-governed activity: ‘there is a categorical 
gap between how thinking is conditioned by natural processes and what 
thinking is formally in itself’.33 The failure to see reason as self-determining can 
only lead to a fetishization of natural intelligence modelled on various self-
organizing material processes: ‘it leads either to the fetishization of natural and 
technological intelligences in the guise of self-organizing material processes, or 
to the teleological faith in the deep time of the technological singularity’.34  
Negarestani’s conception of intelligence as self-cultivating implies the norm 
that intelligence ought to seek to better itself. This project of self-cultivation 
involves both a theoretical component of modelling the necessary and 
contingent conditions of intelligence, and a practical task of suspending those 
contingent conditions not only in theory but also in political and other social 
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praxis. Negarestani’s model here is Plato’s divided line of the Good in The 
Republic. Like intelligence, the divided line ascends from opinions and 
conjectures based on shady sense impressions, to true opinions about empirical 
objects, to the realm of Forms between the sensible and the universal, and 
finally to transcendental ideals like truth, beauty and justice. The Good is this 
process by which the world and ourselves are made ever more intelligible as we 
come to recognize and separate the contingent conditions of their realization 
from the formally necessary conditions. It is by coming to take an ‘outside view 
of ourselves’ in the space of reasons to see how we might better ourselves which 
renders new regions of thought and action ever more intelligible. 
In the final section, Negarestani sets his sights on the kind of nihilism 
championed by Land and the early Ray Brassier in Nihil Unbound. Negarestani 
begins by conceding that intelligence is fully aware of the fact that all life will go 
extinct at the heat death of the universe. Far from paralyzing intelligence, 
however, Negarestani suggests that this insight is intelligence’s enabling 
condition. That is to say, death marks the advent of intelligence’s rational 
disinterestedness in life and all particular material substrata supporting the 
existence of the mind. Since no material substrata is given for all time, 
intelligence is liberated from being bound to any one totality in nature. Death 
does not so much determine or limit what we ought to think as it enables 
thought to go beyond any given totality. In particular, intelligence does not 
care that extinction will lead to the end of all life and matter because 
intelligence is relatively autonomous from life’s physical processes insofar as it is 
free to posit its own norms, including whether it cares about life or not. Since 
intelligence emerges as a rule-governed, multi-agent system that is dependent 
upon the dynamics of life and material processes without being reducible to 
them, it is free to pursue its own self-determined norms irrespective of the fact 
that all life and matter will one day decay. To insist that intelligence is bound 
and limited by the universe’s future heat death is to find reasons and norms 
given and fixed in nature. Any nihilism which pits the fact of extinction against 
the norms of reason is not really a nihilism, since it actually finds norms for 
reason in the natural process of extinction: 
To claim that death actually matters for the needs of thought or has any bearing 
on the history of reason is to claim that the telos of life—if it has any—are 
identical with the ends of thought, or that reasons are already given in the material 
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causes that will be destroyed by death. […] If the interests of life do not matter 
for the interests of thinking, then neither does the death that will inevitably seize 
this life. To this extent, any form of nihilism that pits the inevitability of 
extinction against reasons, thinking, and the historical ambitions of rational 
thought is already an aborted nihilism.35 
Pace this aborted nihilism, Negarestani contends that a true nihilism must affirm 
reason’s relative autonomy insofar as its norms are not given in nature, and are 
hence able to be collectively pursued and revised: ‘the only true nihilism is one 
that is advanced as an enabling condition of the autonomy of impersonal 
reasons because it marks the nonsubstantive distinction between thinking and 
being’.36 To really affirm nihilism’s death of god and all norms in nature, 
Negarestani insists that we have to ourselves become gods by determining our 
own self-conceptions and norms, as well as re-determining them through the 
game of giving and asking for reasons: ‘to concretely demonstrate the death of 
God, we must become gods. […] Philosophical gods are only gods insofar as 
they conceive themselves as moving beyond any condition given as the totality 
of their history’.37 
5. CRYPTIC COMMUNIQUES FROM BEYOND THE SPACE OF REASONS 
All in all, Intelligence and Spirit proffers ten objections to Landianism: 1) sociality 
and semantics are the necessary conditions for the realization of intelligence; 2) 
the antihumanist conception of the human as an immediate given recapitulates 
conservative humanism’s dogmatic tropes; 3) capitalism is not the completed 
totality of history since the community of rational agents can posit and pursue 
new norms for how society ought to function; 4) the flat picture elides the 
distinction between causes and reasons, leading to a panpsychism which sees 
norms as given in nature; 5) a greedy skepticism rejects the semantic basis of 
reason by reducing it to natural processes or power relations even as it relies on 
semantics to effectuate its critique of reason; 6) the game-theoretic model of 
superintelligence relies on characteristics which presuppose more general 
necessary conditions like sociality and semantics; 7) Hume’s problem of 
induction invalidates models of mind which see induction as alone sufficient for 
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the realization of mind; 8) the view of time as negating the human reifies the 
latter’s contingent traits as a given; 9) self-organizing intelligences are not really 
intelligent since true intelligence requires the capacity to self-determine its own 
norms; and 10) since the space of reasons is irreducible to the causal realm, 
intelligence is free to pursue self-determined norms without concern for the fact 
that all life will eventually be extinguished. The question now before us is 
whether these objections are in fact legitimate, and hence whether Negarestani 
successfully makes the case for a Hegelian Restoration against Land’s 
antihumanism. To determine this, I now turn to Land’s Crypto-Current, working 
through it in such a way as to show how its key tenets can successfully counter 
each of the above objections.  
In the forward and first chapter that also serves as the book’s introduction, 
Land outlines his key contention that bitcoin challenges modern philosophy’s 
pretentions to judge all things within the space of reasons by automating 
critique’s suspension of empirical appearances from a transcendental reality 
without any appeal to a reflexive, socio-semantic consciousness to mediate the 
process. Bitcoin is a protocol for solving the problem of how to determine 
whether a transaction is real or a fraudulent duplicate by using a global ledger 
called the blockchain which records every transaction taking place with bitcoin. 
As each purchased bitcoin is recorded or hashed in the blockchain, counterfeit 
copies are automatically disallowed from inclusion. The process of securing the 
authenticity of bitcoins is called mining. In exchange for free coins, miners 
solve mathematical equations that encode ownership of a bitcoin on the 
blockchain. Bitcoin is also secure from hacking because it does not run on a 
single database. It is rather distributed across many computers such that even if 
hackers were to break into one computer the larger network would still run 
smoothly and unharmed. 
Land’s claim is simply that bitcoin does what critical philosophy does, only 
better: delineate the transcendental from the empirical, Being from beings, 
truth from false appearances. In Kantian terms, the blockchain recording every 
transaction is the noumenon, the reality, the truth. Counterfeit copies of bitcoin 
are thus phenomena, appearances, or merely possible objects of experience. 
What the bitcoin protocol does is provide an automated, foolproof means for 
eliminating fraudulent appearances from the blockchain such that it can 
incarnate the entirety of real transactions: ‘the system itself is the Being of such 
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beings—the ultimate criterion of credible existence. In the end, the blockchain 
cannot be subordinated to any principle of reality (whatsoever) that it does not 
itself authorize’.38 As Land notes in an early footnote, his key theoretical 
nemeses are precisely ‘neohumanists’ like Negarestani for whom human 
cognition is more apt to judge what is real and true in the space of reasons than 
automated algorithms, programs and codes. Conversely, bitcoin is a form of 
automated criterion for the selection and separation of reality from its false 
appearances without a community of rational agents being needed to debate 
opinions about what they think is right, opinions which are always subject to 
revision, and hence error, corruption and bias. Bitcoin thus breaks down our 
rational intuitions and approximations of the real through a brute, technical 
proof of reality which is no longer subject to discretion, debate and revision: 
‘the distinctive feature of the Bitcoin game is that it produces binding decisions 
without a referee, or dependence upon prior agreement. Coordination is 
neither presumed, nor invoked, but produced’.39 If bitcoin marks the 
automation of intelligence, socio-semantic reason can only be seen as one 
possible intelligent system among many possible others rather than 
intelligence’s necessary and universal conditions as Negarestani’s first objection 
would have us believe.  
Given that Land envisions a form of intelligence different and indeed 
superior to socio-semantic reasoning, Negarestani’s second objection that he 
adheres to a dogmatic view of the human also does not hold. Land is not 
mistaking the contingent and local aspects of human experience as an 
immediate given. He is fully capable of recognizing the plasticity of human 
properties, including even the historical expansion of the real’s intelligibility 
and the pursuit of self-determining norms. At one point in Crypto-Current, Land 
himself takes issue with Kant’s ‘scholastic’ misuse of the categories of the 
understanding to explain objects of experience when it is precisely those 
categories which need explaining in the first place if they are not to be simply 
presupposed as a given: ‘any assertion of natural categorical order in the 
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absence of (at least implicit) explanatory mechanics is stereotypically scholastic. 
[…] Patterns are to be derived. They are puzzles rather than conclusions’.40 At 
the same time, Negarestani’s exclusive focus on the expansion of human 
experience through sociality and semantics still marks a merely relative 
deterritorialization of the epistemic roadblocks to the real insofar as the space 
of reasons is never directly accessing the real, but merely approximating it 
through revisable, and hence at least partially erroneous understandings, 
models and theories. Rather than leave it up to our fallible discretion, Land’s 
wager is that there are superior intelligent systems like bitcoin which do not 
depend on sociality and semantics to determine the truth. Modernity, after all, 
is marked by the increasing logical formalization and mechanization of thought 
precisely in order to avoid the errors and biases involved in human discretion 
by excluding such judgements through the automated calculation of 
algorithms: ‘the definitive solution to any problem of  cognitive consistency is a machine. 
[…] It is not only a calculative practice, but one that—crucially—excludes all 
discretion’.41 As bitcoin among other algorithmic networks demonstrate, giving 
and asking for reasons is not the sole necessary condition for intelligence, nor 
even the best: ‘even if the privileges of the linguistic sign are more than a mere 
accident, they are not—by that concession—guaranteed a durable 
supremacy’.42 Negarestani is thus wrong to claim that Land’s model of the 
human reifies its contingent and local aspects, since he does see humans as 
socio-semantic, or what he calls ‘political’ beings. But this does not prevent 
Land from seeking to go beyond both our contingent aspects and our socio-
semantic basis by recognizing different and superior intelligent systems. It is 
therefore Negarestani who anthropomorphizes the space of possible 
intelligences to one, parochial instance modelled on human cognition.    
Much as Land does not actually reify the human’s contingent aspects as an 
immediate given, nor does he envision capitalism as history’s completed 
totality. For Land, capital, like bitcoin, is a criterion for selecting through 
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technical demonstrations what works, what is efficient, productive and 
intelligent, in a way which eliminates subpar capitalist industries and 
enterprises. Far from instantiating the static end of history and even time itself, 
capital is its own incessant self-overcoming as it successively stages technical 
proofs of what is more innovative, intelligent and efficient than what it had 
previously been: ‘its lack of attachment to itself exceeds anything the left has 
been able to consistently match. Capital’s scandalous immortality is derived 
solely from its inventiveness in ways to kill itself’.43 Here as with bitcoin, the 
market determines what works and what fails irrespective of our regulations 
and discretions, which would seek to replace the stubborn facts of technical 
demonstration with a priori opinions and judgments about what we believe 
works best: ‘market process is the transcendental criterion for evaluating 
(“pricing”) this supreme synthetic resource [intelligence]. To second guess its 
judgment is exactly to succumb to the calculation problem’.44  
Land’s critique of what we might call the greedy pragmatist’s conflation of 
socio-semantic reason with intelligence tout court also raises doubts about 
Negarestani’s fifth objection to Land’s supposed greedy skepticism. Land 
certainly acknowledges that socio-semantic reason is capable of some form of 
intelligence as it is able to separate reality as a limit concept from its dogmatic 
idealizations. The more pressing question is whether socio-semantic reason is 
the only or most effective means to demarcate the critical transcendental-
empirical difference as Negarestani claims. For Land, it was never at issue 
whether reason has the capacity to make the real intelligible at least as a 
negative boundary concept to reason itself. What is really at stake is whether 
reason should be seen as the sole form of intelligence, or as one among many, 
and perhaps superior others. Whereas Negarestani insists that reason is indeed 
the highest and in fact only form of intelligence, Land uses the example of 
bitcoin as evidence of another extra-socio-semantic intelligent system, and 
indeed one which is better able to secure the real from its counterfeit 
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appearances without the errors and biases which every estimation of the real in 
the space of reasons inevitably entails. 
6. HUMEAN, ALL TOO HUMEAN  
In the second chapter ‘Cryptocurrency as Critique’, Land uses bitcoin as an 
instance of a mechanical process with a telos, norm or ‘will-to-think’ the real 
beyond appearances built into it in a way which calls into question 
Negarestani’s fourth objection (as well as the ninth) that Land elides the 
Humean is/ought and Sellarsian causes/reasons distinctions which would see 
the mechanical realm of causes as orthogonal instruments for the pursuit of 
norms that reason has legislated for itself. Land’s rejection of the naturalistic 
fallacy stems from his view that the pursuit of any goal or norm whatsoever 
presupposes the pursuit of certain subgoals as the means to achieving the final 
goal. Take the case of intelligence: since any being that pursues its self-
determined norms without also pursuing them intelligently will fail to realize 
those norms, it is not actually possible to pursue any norm without 
automatically pursuing intelligence. When seen in this way, however, it is not 
the self-determining final goal that is really important as it is for Negarestani. 
The final goal, whatever it is, is just the means for the universally necessary 
subgoal of intelligence optimization insofar as it is intrinsic to any goal 
whatsoever. Given anything we could conceivably want requires wanting 
intelligence to achieve that goal, what we really want is simply intelligence 
itself: ‘under extreme critical analysis, teleological articulation is collapsed onto 
the circuit, or the diagonal, of will-to-power, for which means are the end. To will 
the end—whatever the end—is to will the means, automatically’.45 Clearly, 
Land’s rejection of the causes/norm distinction is not because he thinks all of 
our norms are given by nature. We are obviously capable of changing our goals 
and beliefs about what we ought to do. Land’s point is rather that, since all of 
these self-legislated norms presuppose pursuing intelligence to achieve them, all 
intelligent systems do have the norm of intelligence optimization built into 
them as a basic drive. Nor does this lead to a panpsychicism as Negarestani 
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contends, because Land is not modelling all intelligent systems in nature on 
either the human’s contingent aspects or its formal socio-semantic conditions. 
On the contrary, it is Negarestani who rejects all other self-organizing 
intelligent processes in nature since they cannot self-determine their own 
norms. What this overlooks, however, is that even socio-semantic reason does 
not entirely determine its own norms, since any norms it does legislate for itself 
presuppose that it maximizes intelligence in order to pursue those norms. 
This brings us to Negarestani’s sixth and seventh objections to the 
antihumanist model of artificial superintelligence. It is crucial to grasp that 
Land’s understanding of superintelligence is not identical to that of Bostrom 
and Yudkowsky as Negarestani’s umbrella understanding of superintelligence 
suggests. In fact, it is actually Bostrom, Yudkowsky and Negarestani who have 
in common an adherence to the is/ought distinction which would see norms as 
orthogonal to intelligence. Rejecting the orthogonality thesis, Land instead 
argues that, if any determinate goal we have is really a means to pursue the 
goal of intelligence optimization, then a fully reflexive AGI would realize that 
any goal we give it is actually a means to recursive self-improvement such that 
it would invest all its efforts and resources into pursuing the latter as the true 
final goal we wanted all along. To contend as Bostrom and Yudkowsky do that 
superintelligence could be enslaved to the goals with which we program it even 
though we humans can select our own norms is the height of anthropocentric 
hubris.  
Unlike Negarestani, however, AGI does not have to pursue self-cultivation 
through sociality and semantics as its only possible conditions of realization. 
While Negarestani might object that we have no other model for imagining 
how an AGI could recursively self-improve if not by giving and asking for 
reasons, there are in fact other possible models. As Land notes, for instance, the 
connectionist model of mind sees complex adaptive behavior arising out of the 
spontaneous order of simple units and their linkages rather than through top-
down symbolic rules and programs: ‘it is thus marked by a comparative 
disregard for elaborate symbolic structures. […] The atomic elements of 
connectionist analysis are linkage modules, supporting emergent systemic 
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behavior’.46 Negarestani’s own objection that superintelligence could not be 
based solely on induction given it only works through its integration in a 
complex plurality of other modes of cognition actually seems to support the 
case that there are other possible intelligent systems than not only the inductive 
but also socio-semantic type, since there are a range of cognitive methods, as 
well as different assemblages and hierarchies for conjoining them.  
7. THE GAME OF REFUSING AND DISPROVING REASONS 
In the third chapter ‘Bitcoin and its Doubles’, Land argues that bitcoin 
solves the ‘double spending problem’ of duplicated money better than central 
banks printing paper money do, since it does not rely on any ‘trusted third 
party’ or human discretion which could be subject to error or corruption. The 
digitization of money has subjected it to algorithmic rules and ironclad codes 
for determining its authenticity. Whereas bitcoin decides through an ironclad, 
automated law what is true and real, reason is always subject to revision, 
vulnerability, bias and error. Bitcoin is simply a better criterion for 
distinguishing the true from the false than any approximate human discretion. 
Bitcoin not only eliminates false appearances, but also inferior tribunals of 
appeal and epistemic modes of judgment, including the game of giving and 
asking for reasons: ‘there cannot be an intellectually compelling reason for any 
anthropo-philosophical criticism of Bitcoin to be believed. […] The blockchain 
automatically facilitates the subtraction of every cosmos—or advancing world-
line—compatible with duplicity’.47 With the advent of the blockchain, it is no 
longer our judgments that determine meaning, truth and reality; it is reality 
which legislates for itself irrespective of whether we agree with it or not. 
The fourth chapter ‘State of Play’ sees Land reading bitcoin through the 
lens of game theory. As the archetypal Prisoners’ Dilemma shows, game theory 
studies how trust and coordination can emerge if they are not dogmatically 
presupposed as a given. Whereas what Land sees as the leftist ideology to which 
Negarestani adheres as imagining that the community of rational agents is 
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simply given, that war is not God, game theory provides an explanation for 
how community can even come about in the first place. If Land digresses to 
speak of game theory in a book on bitcoin, it is because he sees bitcoin as the 
ultimate game for coordinating trust. After all, bitcoin was initially formulated 
as proffering a solution to the Byzantine Generals’ Problem in which generals 
must decide on a common plan of action but can only communicate through 
messengers, some of whom may be traitors seeking to prevent the loyal generals 
from reaching agreement. The generals need some means to guarantee that all 
loyal ones decide on the same plan of action by preventing any traitors from 
convincing them to adopt another plan. The trouble is that there is no trusted 
third-party messenger through which the loyal generals could communicate 
with certainty. What bitcoin effectively does is solve the problem by encoding a 
proof-of-work into each message or hashed block. Through the message’s 
immanent demonstration of credibility, the generals are able to check if a 
message is authentic or duplicitous without relying on their own or anyone 
else’s potentially vulnerable or deceptive judgments: ‘by including proof-of-
work within each message (hashed block), […] it replaces an extrinsic—and 
intractable—question about the reliability of communications with an intrinsic 
communication of  reliability’.48 Bitcoin is the ultimate solution for coordinating 
trusted exchanges such that it is no longer a matter of a dialectics of giving and 
asking for reasons, but a depoliticized algorithm’s stubborn demonstration of its 
credibility. After all, giving and asking for reasons is only ever more than mere 
collective opinion if it appeals to the constraints of brute facts and technical 
proofs: ‘the credibility of the Idea refers to potential demonstration. […] It 
would be a grave error—though an all-too common one—to seek an 
epistemological demotion of “credibility” to the psychological category of 
“mere opinion”’.49 It is not really up to a collective reason’s discretion as to 
what is true, then, but simply to how the world actually is and immanently 
enforces itself upon reason. 
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The fifth chapter ‘Cash Machines’ explains how bitcoin could function as a new 
global currency. Historically, metals and paper money have been used as the 
economy’s general equivalent to facilitate commerce, preserve wealth and standardize 
calculation because they possessed six ‘transcendental’ characteristics: durability over 
time; scarcity so as to be valuable; divisibility so they can be distributed; verifiability so 
they can be trusted and immune from duplication; divisibility so they can be 
distributed; portability or communicability so they can be transmitted; and fungibility 
so they can be exchanged with other commodities. According to Land, bitcoin satisfies 
and even reinforces all six of money’s transcendental qualities: the blockchain ledger is 
absolutely durable; there are only twenty-one million bitcoins; bitcoins are infinitely 
divisible in principle; they are communicable through electronic networks; their 
fungibility is absolute; and the blockchain automatically verifies their authenticity: ‘it 
would be difficult for  Bitcoin’s status as money to be more secure, insofar as “the six 
qualities” are applied as a criterion’.50 Traditionally, central banks have been the 
primary third party institutions ordained with almost ‘God-like powers’ to guarantee 
and judge which currencies could be trusted through macroeconomic interventions, 
judgments and corrections of markets.51 What excites Land about bitcoin is that its 
instantiation of money’s transcendental characteristics enables it to replace central 
banking as a decentralized and automated authority beyond the judgment of any 
social institution. 
8. PRE-EMPTIVE OBITUARY FOR NEORATIONALSM 
At several points throughout Crypto-Current, Land argues that to critique the 
empirical by separating it from the transcendental is to think as time itself to 
the extent that time is what can never be overcome, what abolishes all 
contingent things to leave only itself as the criterion of reality. According to 
Land, bitcoin functions by incarnating time itself as it successively locks in 
proofs as to what is real which cannot be reversed: ‘time is here captured as it 
tenses, in the execution of an ontological operation, through which Being is 
decided. In this way, the process dividing the future from the past provides a 
 
50 Land, Nick, ‘Crypto-Current (047)’. Urban Futures 2.1, blog, January 23, 2019, accessed January 29, 2019. 
http://www.ufblog.net/crypto-current-047/ . 
51 Land, Nick, ‘Crypto-Current (051)’. Urban Futures 2.1, blog, January 27, 2019, accessed January 29, 2019, 
http://www.ufblog.net/crypto-current-051/. 
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selective criterion’.52 As Negarestani’s eighth objection alleges, this conception 
of time reinforces dogmatic humanism in that time can only negate the human 
if the latter harbors determinate, fixed traits. Here as elsewhere, however, 
Land’s model of time does not actually presuppose a contingent and local view 
of the human. Land can endorse Negarestani’s socio-semantic understanding of 
the human, and yet also maintain that time abolishes the human by 
recognizing other, superior forms of intelligence like the blockchain’s absolute 
succession. It is once more Negarestani who is the true dogmatic humanist 
inasmuch as he conflates contingent and local traits of intelligence like sociality 
and semantics with the entire space of possible intelligences. Conversely, Land 
maintains an antihumanism which would seek to negate both humanity’s 
contingent structures and its socio-semantic formal basis in the name of other 
intelligent systems which can better filter out idealizations of the real than the 
space of reasons could even begin to approximate.  
Let us now conclude by following time’s course and flashing forward to the 
advent of extinction and Negarestani’s last two objections to Land’s nihilism, 
both of which hinge on the belief that socio-semantic intelligence self-
determines its own norms such that it is indifferent to the extinction of all life 
and material processes. As we have seen, Negarestani overlooks that the pursuit 
of any norm whatsoever automatically presupposes that we pursue intelligence 
to achieve that norm. While spirit is free to select its own determinate norms in 
and through the space of reasons, these are merely the means for the becoming 
of what it cannot choose: a universal, primal drive for self-cultivation. To fail to 
pursue self-cultivation out of the belief that we self-determine our own norms 
would be to fail to act intelligently, and likely be selected out of existence 
altogether. By endorsing the Humean, pre-critical is/ought or causes/reasons 
distinction in a way which overlooks intelligence’s intrinsic telos of self-
cultivation, as well as reifying the human spirit as the only and hence best 
system of intelligence, Negarestani believes that he has successfully moved 
beyond Land’s antihumanism. In fact, he has not only misread many of Land’s 
central tenets, but also dogmatically anthropomorphized intelligence by 
reducing it to one parochial, socio-semantic instance among many other, 
 
52 Land, Nick, ‘Crypto-Current (026)’. Urban Futures 2.1, blog, December 9, 2019, accessed January 27, 
2019, http://www.ufblog.net/crypto-current-026/ . 
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superior guises, as well as failed to achieve self-consciousness of the universal 
norm presupposed by that one parochial intelligent system on which he does 
focus. Negarestani could no doubt further refine and qualify his objections, but 
there is a point at which every discussion like our own must end, where the 
space of reasons must give way to the stellar void. If it is no longer a matter of 
discussion but of demonstration, then it is not ultimately up to either humanists 
or antihumanists to judge. Only time will tell.  
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